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From Alan Norrie, Justice and the Slaughter Bench (2017, Routledge: Abingdon) 
 
Chapter 10 
Critical Realism and the Metaphysics of Justice 
 
‘we hybrids moulded from clay and spirit’ (Levi 2013, 71) 
 
In this chapter, I consider the problems of guilt in connection with genocide discussed after 
the Second World War by Hannah Arendt, Karl Jaspers, Primo Levi and Jean Améry. I look 
at the different forms of guilt: of perpetrators, bystanders, victims who became perpetrators, 
and of collective guilt. The way in to understand the structure of guilt is to consider the idea 
of survivor guilt, and the chapter link this to an underlying metaphysics of guilt. It considers 
primarily Levi’s account of survivor and accomplice guilt, and the ‘grey zone’ where 
judgment becomes problematic. The aim is to consider the ethical structure that supports our 
understanding of specific guilt categories, and this links Jaspers and Levi to Roy Bhaskar’s 
philosophy of metaReality.  There he argues for a sense of metaphysical unity or identity that 
operates at a deeper level than the difference, conflict and change that occupy his dialectical 
critical realist philosophy. The philosophy of metaReality rounds out and deepens his 
thought, and I explore it for the first time in this chapter, arguing that it represents a key to 
understanding the philosophical thoughts and thoughtful experiences of Jaspers and Levi. The 
chapter considers the shape and structure of ethical enquiry, and what it is that makes ethical 
enquiry possible. From that point of view, it becomes possible to understand better our 
concepts of guilt and justice. 
With regard to critical realism, I wish to say something in the next section about the work of 
the late Roy Bhaskar,1 and its different levels, and how it is relevant to my own views on 
issues of guilt in the law and in moral thinking today. The three levels of critical realism are 
critical realism in its basic form, dialectical critical realism, and metaReality. Bhaskar always 
said that people should take what they wanted or needed from his thought, but that there was 
an immanent logic that led from one level to another. This chapter is in the spirit of that 
remark. My work has been particularly influenced by dialectical critical realism, but recently 
I have started to address what I see as a resistance in legal studies to think metaphysically 
about law. Another way to put this would be to say that I see increasingly the need to think 
metaphysically about issues of justice and guilt in order to understand our contemporary 
juridical practices, and this takes me to the third level of Bhaskar’s philosophy on what he 
termed metaReality.  
Most work in law has a secular and non-metaphysical cast, and the idea of overcoming 
resistance is significant. Bhaskar used to say that his clue as to how to proceed 
philosophically was to push against those points where he encountered most resistance to his 
argument. Broadly, we can say that his work tracks three such resistances in its different 
levels of development. In its first phase, the resistance was most obviously to arguing for 
ontology and depth realism in a world that was much more comfortable to talk of 
                                                          
1 Roy Bhaskar died in November 2014. Before his death, he was able to produce a final work which focuses on 
and integrates his developing account of ontology as the key to the three levels of his philosophy. It is published 
in 2016 under the title Enlightened Common Sense: an Introduction to the Philosophy of Critical Realism by 
Routledge.  
epistemology and empirical reality (Bhaskar 1975, 1979). In its second phase, it was the 
significance of absence or negativity that was key, and here the resistance was historical as 
well as modern (Bhaskar 1993, 1994).2 The third resistance was to what became the ‘spiritual 
turn’ in Bhaskar’s thought, in what he called metaReality. This is the thought that we can 
broadly identify as involving the significance of a metaphysical underpinning to the nature of 
reality (Bhaskar 2012a, 2012b). 
In speaking of identifying and addressing resistances, there is a parallel with the practice of 
psychotherapy, which also has a depth realist aspect. Bhaskar was keen to thematise his work 
around the idea of a ‘reality principle’ that is denied by modern thought in its epistemic and 
positivistic quality. For now, I make the simple point that there was courage in his 
willingness to follow ‘the line of most resistance’. In this chapter, I adopt a similar approach, 
in an area that is daunting even to the uninhibited. I organise my thoughts around two linked 
discussions. First I look briefly at Bhaskar’s work from critical realism to dialectical critical 
realism and on to metaReality. Second, I address issues of guilt and its judgment in the 
context of the aftermath of the Second World War. This starts with thinking about Hannah 
Arendt and Karl Jaspers, and their dialogue on the subject, and then moves on to consider 
Primo Levi’s thoughts in The Drowned and the Saved (Levi 2013) and then Jean Améry’s 
thoughts on collective responsibility in his At the Mind’s Limits (Améry, 1980).  My aim will 
be to link ideas from metaReality with a metaphysics of guilt, which I will draw from Jaspers 
and Levi, and then apply to concepts of perpetrator, accomplice, bystander and collective 
guilt. 
 
The Different Phases of Critical Realism 
The basic achievement of critical realism is the revindication of ontology over the imperialist 
ambitions of epistemology, and within that, the vindication of a particular, depth, ontology. 
The analysis of what scientists did in both the natural and social sciences was only explicable 
once you understood that the world was real and existed independently of thinking about it  
(Bhaskar 1975) (or at least this was relatively the case with regard to the social sciences: 
Bhaskar 1979). More than that, the world was structured, deep, and with generative 
mechanisms at play that could be discovered by scientific investigation. A depth realist mode 
of enquiry into such mechanisms was required as the basis for understanding how the world 
worked. Particularly relevant to the social sciences was the existence of structures and, 
working to produce, reproduce or transform these, agency. The structure-agency couple, 
together with the hermeneutic circle that this engaged (Bhaskar 1979 ch.4), had to be 
understood. Once grasped, reasons could be seen as causes and, ultimately, a scientific 
naturalist attitude was as possible in the social as in the natural sciences mutatis mutandis. 
Depth realism in the social sciences recognised natural necessity, but it had also to deal with 
a particular kind of subject, the human being as agent. 
These are the core ideas of basic or original critical realism and Bhaskar was to spend the 
1980s and 1990s working to develop it first in the direction of dialectical critical realism, and 
then metaReality. In dialectical critical realism, the idea of a structured and differentiated 
world was developed in three moves. The first of these was the idea that central to our 
understanding of the world is the importance of change, and change is to be understood as 
involving the negation of what exists as it is transformed and becomes something else. The 
                                                          
2 In his dialectical philosophy, Bhaskar traces the problems and therefore the ‘metacritique’ of western 
philosophy back to the Greeks Parmenides and Plato, where absence (real determinate non-being) is denied. See 
Norrie 2010, chs 6,7. 
world is constantly changing and this ‘becoming and begoing’ is understood in terms of 
absenting what is there, the ‘real determinate negation’ of what exists. This recognition of 
absence as real determinate negativity was essential, and those who refused this move had a 
one dimensional, ‘ontologically monovalent’, attitude to the world (Bhaskar 1993; Norrie 
2010 chs 2,6,7). At the same time, all change is geo-historically located and subject to its own 
spatio-temporal rhythms (Bhaskar 1993 chs 2.2, 3.6; Norrie 2010, 28-34).  
Second, alongside this, the structure-agency dual was transformed into four-planar social 
being in which relations with nature, interpersonal relations, social (institutional, structural) 
relations per se and intrapersonal relations (individual psychic structures) all go to constitute 
the human being’s concrete universality/ singularity (Bhaskar 1993, ch 2.7, 2.9, Norrie 2010, 
113-7). Putting the first and second points together, we can summarise the core perspective of 
dialectical critical realism as an understanding of the world as involving both structured being 
and becoming. Third, attached to these, there was a further move to integrate an ethical 
understanding of human freedom and solidarity with the socio-historical (spatio-temporal) 
understanding of the evolution of human being as a special kind of natural, anthropological, 
being (Bhaskar 1993 ch 3; Norrie 2010, ch 5). 
What I have just described is sometimes referred to as the MELD structure of dialectical 
critical realism. The first Moment of basic, structural critical realism moves to a second Edge 
of negativity and is transformed thereby, before a third Level of seeing things as a whole, in 
their totality, emerges, and this leads to a fourth Dimension of ethical agency or praxis. 
Though not too much should be read into the MELD structure (it is as much descriptive of a 
particular journey as providing a necessary form for the theory), its end point, ethical agency 
or praxis, was already present in original critical realism. Now, however, it is thought through 
as a drive towards freedom in its various forms, which can only be achieved in solidarity with 
others. The logical and practical outcome of this drive to universalise the forms of freedom 
and solidarity is the latent, potential, tendential possibility of the eudaimonic condition, one 
in which the free flourishing of each depends on the free flourishing of all (Bhaskar 1993, ch 
3.10; Norrie 2010, 144-56). This, it might be added, requires as its condition, the flourishing 
of the planet and other natural species as a whole. 
Such a vision only needs to be stated in order to disclose the gulf between the actually 
existing world with its generic master-slave relations, and the immanent, real possibilities 
available to human being. Nonetheless, the message of dialectical critical realism is that the 
gulf is real only because both sides, the world that actually exists, and what is really possible 
within it, are both true, or ‘alethic’,3 as Bhaskar has it. The vision of dialectical critical 
realism is of a world in which alienation, splits, contradictions and conflicts animate 
modernity alongside the inherent, latent possibilities that exist for human socio-natural being. 
Bhaskar, however, was not to leave his argument there. There was a further development to 
occur, which involves the idea of metaReality. If the eudaimonic condition is a tendential, un- 
or under-actualised possibility for modernity, then it is real, true and alethic. What form does 
this condition take? Its emphasis on the universal, on connection and solidarity, and on the 
full flourishing of each and all, indicates a potential for universality, identity and oneness 
contained within the actually existing world of splits, contradictions, lacks and dualisms. 
Modernity exists as a world of conflict and structural violence: Bhaskar thematises the 
existence of what he called power2 or generalised master-slave relations. Underlying this, 
                                                          
3 The truth of, or real reasons for, or dialectical ground of things, as distinct from propositions: Bhaskar 1993, 
394; Norrie 2010, 126. 
however, he began to see a deeper sense of identity, which he was to analyse in metaphysical 
terms at the level of metaReality. 
In metaReality (Bhaskar 2002, 2012a, 2012b), Bhaskar builds this vision in his analysis of 
the ways in which moments of transcendental connection underpin social transactions that are 
conflicted and split – in the forms of human exchange where even simple communications 
disclose moments of real identity and connection, in the senses of community that exist even 
in communities that are split and contradictory, in the transcendental feeling that participating 
in nature or music, art, or literature provides, or in acts of kindness and love. In moments of 
creativity which overcome the split between subject and object we also find identity behind 
non-identity. 
Such considerations led Bhaskar in this third phase of his thought to consider being as 
involving an ultimate unity that underlies difference and conflict, between oneself and the 
other, across time and place: a co-presence in human being of all the experiences open to 
human beings, for good and ill, and this co-presence lies at the core of metaReality. It 
involves a sense of universality in the human condition. Co-presence ‘is where some other 
thing is enfolded or implicit within a being’ and the claim of metaReality is that ‘the alethic 
truth of all other beings’ is enfolded within myself (Bhaskar 2012b, xlix). Beings remain 
distinct in their constitution and their location in space and time, but my potential ability to 
understand or identify with another stems from an ultimate underlying identity.  
For myself, I resisted this third move in the initial ways that Bhaskar presented it. It seemed 
to me to abandon, or at least to downplay, the central importance of what he had achieved in 
his dialectics and original critical realism. I felt it led too quickly to an ethical ‘call to arms’ 
which de-emphasised the historicity and structuration of conflict. Yet I couldn’t get away 
from the sense that there was something very important in what he was saying, and 
something that, because it was true, would have to come out in the working and therefore the 
thought of law. That something is found in the idea of metaphysical guilt, which I first 
encountered in Jaspers’s thought, and which I now investigate in Levi and his and Améry’s 
accounts of guilt. 
Before moving on, though, let me give a brief centenary illustration of what I have in mind. 
In 1916, after the Easter Uprising in Dublin, Sir Roger Casement was hanged by the British 
for treason. Casement, who was born and raised in Ireland, had been knighted by the British 
in 1911 for his work in exposing the conditions of Amazonian Indians working in rubber 
plantations. In this work and earlier work relating to the position of native Africans in similar 
settings in the Congo, Casement had become convinced of the iniquities of western 
colonialism, and he came to see the relationship of Ireland to Britain in similar terms. During 
the First World War, he sought to raise a regiment of Irish nationalist troops from those held 
prisoner by the Germans and also sought German arms for the rising. When he was arrested 
on landing on the Irish coast, he was charged with treason, sabotage and espionage and taken 
to the Tower of London. He was hanged in London in August 1916. A strong campaign was 
mounted against his execution, but this was countered by stories circulated in the press 
relating to a set of diaries that he had seemingly written which showed him to be a 
promiscuous homosexual. Prior to his execution, Casement was received into the Catholic 
Church, and his last words were as follows: 
My final message for everyone is a sursum corda. I wish the best to those who will 
take my life and those who have tried to save it. All of you are now my brothers. 
(Vargas Llosa 2012, 388) 
Mario Vargas Llosa has recently described Casement as a man of contradictions and 
contrasts, and, though no model of perfection, one where ‘angels and demons combine 
inextricably in his personality’. In Ireland, he has ‘gradually, though always with reluctance 
and prudery’ begun to be accepted as ‘one of the great anti-colonial figures and defenders of 
human rights and indigenous cultures of his time, and a sacrificed combatant for the 
emancipation of Ireland’ (Vargas Llosa 2012, 398).  
In light of this, it is the power and significance of those final words to which I point, and the 
sense of identity and co-unity between Casement and his enemies. Casement was to be 
executed by his enemies in the middle of a world war, after a violent uprising against a 
colonial power that he opposed, and that had been ruthlessly suppressed. When he had been 
tried by a British court, he refused to recognise it, and in order to promote his execution 
against significant opposition, his character had been dragged through the mud. A holy man, 
no doubt, as his late reception into the church makes clear, but the religious dimension is not 
central to the point. The point is that a human being could find the grace to see his enemies 
and executioners as his brothers prior to his death. How do we understand this moral quality 
to surface as it did in the end for Casement? It is the sense of identity beyond difference and 
conflict that lies at the heart of Bhaskar’s non-religious philosophy of metaReality which I 
wish to pursue. In what follows, my focus will now turn to issues of war guilt. 
 
The Problem of War Guilt: Arendt and Jaspers 
If we now explore this sense of the metaphysical in relation to the question of guilt, I am 
interested in the idea of ‘transitional justice’. This involves the problems thrown up for 
justice by transitions from one regime to another, where the transition involves dealing with 
figures in the old regime in terms of calling them to account for their actions. One sees this in 
many parts of the world, especially nowadays in Latin America, but also in Africa (Rwanda, 
South Africa). The locus classicus of the problem is the war crimes trials of the Nazis after 
the Second World War, and I’ve done some work on the views of Hannah Arendt in 
Eichmann in Jerusalem (Arendt 1964), and her engagement immediately after the war with 
Karl Jaspers (above, Chapter …). 
Jaspers had written a book on German war guilt (Jaspers 2000), and Arendt had responded 
that Germany was saddled with a real problem. There were tens or hundreds of thousands of 
people who could not be adequately punished for their crimes. The problem was not just one 
of numbers or scale, but the widespread, systematic abandonment of its moral compass by 
whole swathes of a people. What had been done was carried out by ‘civilised barbarians’, 
who had no sense of the wrongness of their actions, despite their enormity. The problem was 
focused later in her consideration of Eichmann, who, she argued, could be executed but not 
on the basis of the normal moral understanding that he had done wrong, which his 
punishment could communicate. Eichmann, and many like him, was incapable of such 
communication, because he could not see that he had done wrong. He thought indeed that he 
had done his ‘duty’, that he had acted ‘according to Kant’. Punishment would therefore lack 
the normal moral quality that was expected of it. There was no possibility of a moral dialogue 
with such a person. 
The argument seems both logically persuasive and morally counter-intuitive. It makes sense 
in terms of the need to address Eichmann as a responsible moral agent, but it leads to the 
conclusion that the worse someone like him behaved, the less justice could make its claims 
upon him. In opposition to this, I pursued Jaspers’s argument when he distinguished four 
different kinds of guilt – political, legal, moral and metaphysical – but I noted the 
problematic quality of this typology at the same time. Political guilt was an ‘external’ form of 
guilt involving for example reparations that were imposed on a people as a whole by a 
victorious power, regardless of their actual wrongdoing. Legal guilt, again an ‘external’ form, 
was imposed on individuals where a crime was formally identified, and where a formally free 
act had taken place. Neither of these forms of guilt addressed the moral dialogue that a 
process of criminal justice is normally thought to involve. Moral guilt, on the other hand, was 
an ‘internal’ form of guilt, but in Jaspers’s account, it was not appropriate for engagement in 
a public trial process. Instead, it involved a moral agent’s private engagement with himself 
and with close family and friends.  In any case, it was self-evident that the accused in the 
trials of Nazis felt no such guilt.  That did however leave the fourth form of guilt, 
metaphysical guilt, and this intrigued me. What did Jaspers mean by this fourth category? 
In this first quotation, morality’s ‘mundane purposes’ are contrasted with the more 
transcendental quality of metaphysical guilt, which involves an absolute solidarity or unity 
with other human beings, one which goes beyond a ‘morally meaningful’ sense of duty. This, 
importantly, taps into the idea of ‘survivor guilt’, about which, more below: 
Morality is always influenced by mundane purposes. . . . Metaphysical guilt is the 
lack of absolute solidarity with the human being as such—an indelible claim beyond 
morally meaningful duty. This solidarity is violated by my presence at a wrong or a 
crime. It is not enough that I cautiously risk my life to prevent it; if it happens, and if I 
was there, and if I survive where the other is killed, I know from a voice within 
myself: I am guilty of being still alive. (Jaspers 2000, 65) 
In the following passage, this sense of absolute solidarity as an unconditional obligation to 
every other is articulated as follows: 
Somewhere among men the unconditional prevails – the capacity to live only together 
or not at all. . . . Therein consists the substance of their being. But that this does not 
extend to the solidarity of all men, . . . but remains confined to the closest of human 
ties – therein lies this guilt of us all. (Jaspers, 2000, 26) 
In considering Jaspers’s account, one can identify perhaps five different meanings of the 
“metaphysical” as it connects with guilt. These are, first, the lack of absolute solidarity with 
the human being as such, as above, and, second, and closely connected, to identify but not 
live by the unconditioned in human relations. These fundamental metaphysical or 
transcendental elements represent the basis by way of negative contrast for a third meaning, 
to live in history and politics. In such a state, one does not live by the unconditional alone. A 
fourth meaning, closely linked to the third, is to live in relations of power given to one. 
Finally, a fifth meaning links to survivor guilt: to live after a crime, to survive it. 
In terms of the debate between Arendt and Jaspers, the value of this conception of 
metaphysical guilt was that, in a world where the worst perpetrators felt no guilt, indeed felt 
vindicated in what they had done, here was a conception of guilt that could operate beyond 
the need for actual acceptance of, or capacity for, moral dialogue between perpetrators and 
those judging them. Of course, Jaspers was speaking at the highest level of abstraction, and 
he was not speaking of the guilt of those who were perpetrators, but either onlookers or 
survivors. Nonetheless, the conception of guilt here was non-actualist, and related to a deeper 
set of claims about universality and humanity, and what humans owe to each other, regardless 
of whether this was accepted in an agent’s particular understanding or actual acceptance of 
responsibility. My argument therefore was that one could take this formulation which Jaspers 
deployed to speak of universal guilt – of the survivor, the bystander, and the collective group 
– and turn it on the perpetrators themselves. Metaphysical guilt, operating at a different level, 
was complexly related to, but in some way operated to underpin, the other forms of guilt, in 
the political, legal and moral spheres. In providing it with a fuller role in relation to Jaspers’s 
typology, it was possible to see the limitations of Arendt’s criticism of guilt attribution in the 
case of perpetrators of crimes against humanity. 
This was the attraction of the idea of metaphysical guilt, but it seems on reflection to be 
vulnerable to criticism. Jaspers himself had worried that his conception would be too abstract, 
too questionable, and would be seen as simply the crazy idea of a philosopher (Jaspers 2010, 
68). His own background was in Christian pietism, and it might be thought that the idea of 
metaphysical guilt reflects too much his Christian worldview. A further meaning he had 
given to metaphysical guilt involved the common guilt of mankind, by which he meant 
‘original sin’. The resolution of such guilt was to be sought by living in relation with God, 
and reflecting on the way to humble self-purification. Is it only from a religious point of view 
that metaphysical guilt appears valid, and if so, what persuasive power does it have for those 
who do not share it? In reaching into this domain, is one in danger of basing one’s thought on 
a terrain that academics, legal and otherwise, will find hard to accept? We may be happy to 
strike a further blow against the ‘positivist unconscious’, that dominates much academic 
work, but are we reaching for a somewhat ‘local’ universal in pressing Jaspers into service? 
Alternatively, is it possible to align Jaspers’s conception with the view advanced by Bhaskar 
in his philosophical, non-theological,4 account of metaReality?  
One way of reflecting on these concerns is to pose a more concrete question. It will be 
recalled that the fifth meaning of metaphysical guilt involved the person who survives a 
crime. It is with regard to that meaning that I will pursue my concern here. The question can 
be put as follows: is a conception like survivor guilt no more than a fancy name for 
psychological trauma, or does it deserve a different kind of understanding, as a form of 
metaphysical guilt? If it does, this would support the intuition that such a conception may be 
important to our understanding not just of the metaphysical, but of how the metaphysical 
manifests itself in worldly guilt and justice. 
 
The Nature of Survivor Guilt: Reading Primo Levi 
In this section, I begin with the understanding of survivor guilt in psychoanalytical accounts 
of survivor trauma, before considering how this conception of guilt as psychological mimesis 
is taken up and extended metaphysically by Levi. It is on this basis that the distinctions as 
well as the difficulties in his account of the different kinds of guilt emanating from the 
experience of the Camp can be understood, including his account of the ‘grey zone’. 
Guilt versus Shame: the Nature of Survivor Guilt 
Survivor guilt is a controversial topic in the psychoanalytical understanding of traumatisation, 
and it is also a topic taken up by Primo Levi in his account of life and survival in the 
concentration camp. A helpful intermediary between the two uses is the work of Ruth Leys 
on guilt and shame (Leys 2007), which analyses the psychoanalyical debate on survivor guilt 
and draws on Levi to do so.  
Leys’s book is a powerful analysis of evolving directions in the psychiatric analysis of 
trauma, and the use of the concept of survivor guilt in the treatment of trauma disorders. Her 
argument is that conceptions of shame have over the last thirty years tended to supplant 
conceptions of guilt, and this has meant ultimately a move to seeing trauma in terms of an 
                                                          
4 ’What I wanted to do was to make spirituality compatible with secularism.’ Bhaskar 2010, 167. 
external psychological assault on the victim, from the outside. In the approach associated 
with guilt, on the other hand, the analysis of traumatic disorder involves a sense of the 
potential for taking an internal view of the psychology of the victim. This may involve a 
process of mimesis, or imitation and identification with the person perpetrating the violence. 
It is mimesis, under the requirement of survival, that leads ultimately to the sense of guilt that 
we call survivor guilt, and which lies at the root of the way some victims experience their 
traumatic situation: 
The concept of survivor guilt had been theorised within the terms of psychoanalytic 
ideas about the relationship – the imitative or identificatory relationship – between the 
victim and the aggressor. The claim … was that one characteristic, indeed primordial, 
mode of defense against violence was for the victim to save herself by giving in to 
power and identifying with the threatening other. (Leys 2007, 181) 
Such identification leads in due course to feelings of guilt as the victim reflects consciously 
or unconsciously on their past thought processes and how they had identified with the 
perpetrator in the time when they had survived, but others had perished. According to Leys, 
the sense of trauma as survivor guilt draws on something of this more classical 
psychoanalytic understanding. The significance of this claim has in recent times been 
contested, but it is not my purpose to enter into the internal debate between psychiatrists and 
psychoanalysts, or between Freudians, post-Freudians and anti-Freudians. As we will go on 
to see, it is borne out by Levi’s account of his own moral experience of the Camp. 
Accordingly, Leys’s analysis, which is sympathetic to the classical approach, is helpful in 
positing a material psychological mechanism that can underpin the idea of survivor guilt. The 
question for me now is whether it can help us in understanding the role of metaphysical guilt 
as deployed by Jaspers. Can we then develop the idea beyond the religious basis that might 
otherwise be our only way of understanding what he has to say? 
From Mimesis to Metaphysics 
In working through her defence of survivor guilt with regard to the internal, mimetic 
approach to guilt in the psychoanalytic/ psychiatric literature, Leys had looked closely at 
Levi’s experience of the death and labour camp, especially in his book The Drowned and the 
Saved (Levi 2013). If we follow her there, we find an analysis that substantially supports her 
argument about survivor guilt, but also takes us further, towards an ethical, metaphysical, 
conception.5 In the Camp, Levi writes, power was sought amongst others ‘by the many 
among the oppressed who were contaminated by the oppressors and unconsciously strove to 
identify with them’ (Levi 2013, 45). Levi describes as mimesis the ‘identification or 
imitation, or exchange of roles between oppressor and victim’ (Levi 2013, 45-6). He warned, 
however, that this idea ‘has provoked much discussion,’ continuing that much of it has 
proved highly problematic (Levi 2013, 46).  
We will come to the difficulties in the next section, but for now, we should note the salience 
of the mechanism of mimesis for Levi. There is however an important difference in his 
approach from the analysis presented by Leys, and it involves the different – moral - register 
                                                          
5 Giorgio Agamben (2002, 94-7) seeks to dismiss the idea of survivor guilt in Levi’s account. Linking it to 
collective guilt and then to the analysis of guilt in Greek tragedy, he misses the ground I discuss below 
concerning metaphysical guilt. He wishes to sideline survivor guilt in order to promote a ‘new ethics’ located in 
Levi’s grey zone, but based on shame as the focus of an existential ontology of subjectification and 
desubjectification. (2002, 104-35). The key link is Robert Antelme’s account of a young Italian student whose 
face turns pink (flushes) when he is picked at random for execution on a death march. It appears, however, that 
Agamben has interpreted this event in his own way: see Leys 2007, 174-9. 
in which he thinks. For Levi, what was at stake was not simply a psychological, trauma-
inducing, mechanism, though that was a crucial part. Beyond it was an ethical wrong that had 
been done that went to the heart of what it meant to be human. His comment that he does ‘not 
believe that psychoanalysts … are competent to explain this impulse’ (Levi 2013, 90) 
emphasises the difference in standpoints. Psychoanalytical knowledge had not been 
developed in the Camp, and even where a psychoanalyst such as Bruno Bettleheim had 
experience of the Camp, the analysis seems ‘approximate and simplified, as if someone 
wished to apply the theorems of plain geometry to the solution of spheric triangles’ (Levi 
2013, 90). In seeking the correct ethical register, Levi observes that everyone in the Camp 
‘suffered from an unceasing discomfort that polluted sleep and was nameless. To define this 
as a ‘neurosis’ is reductive and ridiculous’ (Levi 2013, 91). It would, he says, ‘be more 
correct to see in it an atavistic anguish, [that] of a deserted and empty universe crushed under 
the spirit of God, but from which the spirit of man is absent: not yet born or already 
extinguished’ (Levi 2013, 91).6 Earlier in the book, he had written, in the case of those who 
had collaborated, of ‘the death of the soul’ which yields and breaks under pressure (Levi 
2013, 60), and of being made to live ‘at an animal level’, in which ‘our moral yardstick has 
changed’ (Levi 2013, 78). But there are two sides to the hybrids that we are, and it is the 
spiritual side of humankind that needs to be attended to in thinking about survivor guilt. Here 
the psychoanalyst cannot help us. 
In a number of passages, Levi returns to the need to think through the metaphysics of guilt. 
To return to normal life from the mental states imposed in the Camp was not just to 
experience and work through psychological trauma, it was to experience and live with a sense 
of ethical abandonment that went to the very heart of what it meant to be human, and to 
possess a human spirit. Many of the precise comments made by Levi take these observations 
and give them a transcendental or metaphysical frame. In the following quotation, Levi points 
to the general capacity of humankind to turn the world into one of sheer pain, and the impact 
of knowledge of this on those who observed it: 
The just among us,… felt remorse, shame and pain for the misdeeds that others and 
not they had committed, and in which they felt involved, because they sense that what 
had happened around them in their presence, and in them was irrevocable. It would 
never again be able to be cleansed; it would prove that man, the human species – we 
in short – were potentially able to construct an infinite enormity of pain. (Levi 2013, 
92) 
More concretely, there is the failure to offer solidarity with a human being who is your 
companion, whom you fail to help. This is the nub of survivor guilt: 
Almost everybody feels guilty of having omitted to offer help. The presence at your 
side of a companion who is weaker, or less cunning, or older, or too young, hounding 
you with his demands for help or with his simply being there…. The demand for 
solidarity, for a human word, advice, even only a listening ear was permanent and 
universal but rarely satisfied. (Levi 2013, 82) 
And finally, there is again the guilt of the survivor, or perhaps just the observer, who now 
knows that humankind, and therefore the individual him or herself, may be capable of such 
things. In the following passage, Levi points to specific failures to act, but it seems that not 
                                                          
6 Levi writes that he ‘entered the Lager as a non-believer, and as a non-believer I was liberated and have lived to 
this day’ (2013, 163). The reference to God in this passage must be read in this light. 
acting or not acting adequately, is a further issue to the simple guilt at the existence of a 
crime. Here he speaks of  
.…the shame which the just man experiences when confronted by a crime committed 
by another, and he feels remorse because of its existence, because of its having been 
irrevocably introduced into the world of existing things, and because his will has 
proven non-existent or feeble and was incapable of putting up a good defence. (Levi 
2013, 75) 7 
However one reads these comments, it seems that they occupy similar territory to Jaspers’s 
account of metaphysical guilt. An understanding of this deep layer of human being or 
experience is central to the nature of the judgment of guilt. On Levi’s account, survivor guilt 
operates as living proof in the extreme or limit case of the significance of Jaspers’s account. 
We have moved here beyond the understanding of such guilt as a material mental mechanism 
underlying traumatisation, though what we have is a deepening of the understanding of such 
things, rather than simply an alternative mode of explanation. The metaphysical, indeed, 
builds on the existence of the mental mechanism, but it is important to see that it is 
acknowledged by the testimony of the survivor as a sentiment generated by the reality of the 
camp experience, and not just as a metaphysical speculation. Survivor guilt was ingredient in 
the real structure and the actual events. 
 
Perpetrators, Victims, Collaborators8 
Now, however, we need to pause, and to be clear about the line of argument. We have seen 
that survivor guilt can operate to indicate a deep sense of metaphysical guilt in the human 
condition, and the argument has been that this conception can operate to ground a Jaspersian 
response to an Arendtian question. But I noted above that we move here between two forms 
of actual, worldly guilt: that of the Camp survivor (the victim) and that of the war criminal 
(the perpetrator), and these are two very different people. As we noted above, Levi was both 
drawn to the theory of mimesis, to which he gave an ethical turn, and also concerned that it 
led to serious misunderstanding about the nature of guilt in the Camp. We need to explore 
this point.  
Perpetrators and Victims 
The problem with survivor guilt is that it can lead to the conclusion that all are complicit in 
guilt, and this can erase the important distinctions between different kinds of guilt. It is clear 
that people, perpetrators and victims, are not guilty in the same way, or for the same things, 
and some are not guilty at all. Here, Levi wanted to hold on to a sense of the universal guilt 
we share for the existence of the Camp, while being clear about the distinctions we need to 
draw to identify the guilt of different classes of agents in relation to it. These included those 
in the ‘grey zone’ of collaboration that existed between the victim and the perpetrator. He 
adopts a subtle and nuanced line, which both acknowledges who the real perpetrators are, and 
assigns a degree of responsibility, or refuses to do so, to those who collaborated, but all this 
against the horizon of a general sense of universal responsibility. 
                                                          
7 Levi uses the term ‘shame’ here, but he uses it interchangeably with ‘guilt’ in this work. 
 
8 A further category that ought to be discussed here is that of the supporters and beneficiaries of systems 
premised on structural violence: see Norrie 2008, 228, and generally, Meister 2012. Perhaps we should talk of 
‘beneficiary guilt’ alongside that of the perpetrator, accomplice, bystander, survivor and the collective. 
With regard to collaborators, Levi cites the case of Rumkowski, the Chief Elder of the jews 
of Lodz. He writes of Rumkowski’s distorted view of the world, his dogmatic arrogance, his 
clinging to power, and his contempt for law. The man had been drugged by the power given 
him by the Nazis, but, Levi notes, this ‘does not exonerate [him] from his responsibilities’ 
(Levi 2013, 69). His own life was tragic but, still, though there were extenuating 
circumstances, ‘no tribunal would have absolved him, nor certainly can we absolve him in the 
moral plane’ (Levi 2013, 70). Yet, Levi also describes this as a case of impotentia judicandi. 
Are many of us not just like Rumkowski? 
We are all mirrored in Rumkowski, his ambiguity is ours, it is our second nature, we 
hybrids moulded from clay and spirit; his fever is ours, the fever of our Western 
civilisation that ‘descends into hell with trumpets and drums’, and its miserable 
adornments are the distorting images of our symbols of social prestige. (Levi 2013, 
71) 
Levi continues that, like Rumkowski, we are all dazzled by power and prestige so that we 
forget our ‘essential fragility’. We all come to terms with power, ‘forgetting that we are all in 
the ghetto, that the ghetto is walled in, that outside the ghetto reign the lords of death and that 
close by the train is waiting’ (Levi 2013, 71).  Despite this impotence in judging in the ‘grey 
zone’, Rumkowski stands as one who deserves to be held responsible.  
There were, however, others who worked the system and should not be held accountable. 
Some were ready to compromise and, as ‘grey, ambiguous persons,’ ‘they are the rightful 
owners of a quota of guilt’ (Levi 2013, 47). But others, for example the ‘crematorium ravens’, 
those who worked in the special squads in the crematoria in order to preserve their own lives 
for a few weeks – no one is authorised to judge them, and ‘a judgement of them [should] be 
suspended’ (Levi 2013, 61). Here the language is important, since a judgement suspended is 
nonetheless one that can be made – but not carried out. Impotentia judicandi again, yet with a 
different outcome to that in the case of Rumkowski. 
It should be repeated however that none of this counts against the full responsibility of the 
perpetrators, the men and women who ran the death camps. As Levi says, it is crucial not to 
conflate perpetrators, victims, and collaborators. A sense of the universality of the human 
condition should not undermine these distinctions. As regards the different positions of the 
perpetrator and the victim, Levi says, ‘I do not know … whether in my depths there lurks a 
murderer, but I do know that I was a guiltless victim and I was not a murderer’. Confusing 
the two roles ‘means wanting to becloud our need for justice’.  Yet, it is having just said this 
that he then wishes to make a ‘few more remarks’ about the grey, ambiguous people: the 
crematorium ravens, those who cooperated in running the system, but also, it seems, himself 
who did not do enough, who failed to offer solidarity, who continued to live while a crime 
was committed, who witnessed the systemic rendering of the world as one of enormous pain. 
There remains a commonality of guilt, but there are also victims, perpetrators and 
collaborators.  
Overall, it must be recalled, the three groups are located in the structure and context of the 
Camp, which allows perpetrators to victimise, and turns some victims into accomplices. The 
‘greatest responsibility lies with the system, the very structure of the totalitarian state….’ 
(Levi 2013, 40). It is that which establishes the setting in which the different kinds of actor 
operate. What it does not do is homogenise all guilt into a general category, though it 
complicates it beyond a simple account of perpetrators and victims.9 
Bystanders and Collective Guilt 
Then there is the guilt of the bystander. Insofar as he or she is a Camp inmate, the bystander 
is the person who may feel guilt at not having acted, in the ways described above. But 
bystander guilt goes further than this, into the question of a general guilt that might exist for a 
people that has allowed genocide to occur. Here again, we should consider the positions of 
Arendt and Jaspers. For Arendt, a distinction is made between political and moral 
responsibility. With regard to the former, she agrees that every generation ‘is burdened by the 
sins of the fathers as it is blessed with the deeds of the ancestors’ (Arendt 2003, 27), but this 
should not lead to a sense of personal responsibility for it is only metaphorically that we can 
say ‘we feel guilty for the sins of our fathers or our people or mankind, in short for deeds we 
have not done’. Morally speaking, ‘it is as wrong to feel guilty without having done anything 
specific as it is to feel free of all guilt if one actually is guilty of something’ (Arendt 2003, 
28). From this standpoint, she neatly pins the tendency in post-war German debate to 
whitewash individual perpetrators for what they had done, since all were guilty anyway. But 
this was surely a consequence of political moves in favour of post-war reconstruction, rather 
than a necessary consequence of identifying both individual perpetrators and a general sense 
of a collective guilt as distinct moral phenomena. 
Jaspers’s approach to the same issue is intriguing and different. His initial view is that 
collective guilt exists only in the limited form of political liability, for ‘there is no such thing 
as a people as a whole’ so that the ‘categorical judgment of a people is always unjust ... and 
results in the debasement of the human being as an individual.’ Accordingly, ‘to pronounce a 
group criminally, morally or metaphysically guilty is an error akin to the laziness and 
arrogance of average, uncritical thinking’ (Jaspers 2000, 35-6). Yet, later in his account, 
Jaspers becomes concerned that his fourfold typology, though ‘correct and meaningful,’ 
might have lost something in the process, which ‘in collective guilt is always audible in spite 
of everything’. In the end, he finds himself returning ‘to the question of collective guilt’   
(Jaspers 2000, 69), and this leads him back to the formulations we encountered above relating 
to metaphysical guilt. People live under evolving conditions which determine the moral 
aspects of a nation’s life and which ‘help to determine individual morality.’ The individual 
lives ‘as a link in [a] chain’ and there ‘is a sort of collective moral guilt in a people’s way of 
life which I share as an individual’ (Jaspers 2000, 70). The world of which the Germans were 
a part could produce a regime such as the Nazis, and this is a moral fact for which all 
Germans are at a certain level responsible. 
We . . . feel that we not only share in what is done at present—thus being co-
responsible for the deeds of our contemporaries – but in the links of a tradition. We 
have to bear the guilt of our fathers. That the spiritual conditions of German life 
provided an opportunity for such a regime is a fact for which all of us are co-
responsible. . . . (Jaspers 2000, 73) 10 
Levi also confronts the question of collective guilt, in the shape of those who ‘turn their 
backs so as not to see [the crime] and not feel touched by it’. This is ‘what the majority of 
                                                          
9 Compare Agamben’s understanding that the Camp reduces all to a ‘zone of irresponsibility’ (2002, 21) ‘in 
which victims become executioners and executioners become victims’ (2002, 17). This is not Levi’s position. 
See Leys (2007, 157-61) for a considered critical response to this. 
10 Ultimately, Jaspers extends the claim of metaphysical guilt beyond the German context to a ‘guilt of all’, 
while insisting that this ‘must not become a way to dodge German guilt’ (Jaspers 2000, 94). 
Germans did during the twelve Hitlerian years, deluding themselves that not seeing was a 
way of not knowing, and that not knowing relieved them of their share of complicity or 
connivance’ (Levi 2013, 91).11 How does Levi’s view of bystander guilt relate to the 
metaphysical conception that we have seen underpins his account of survivor guilt? To speak 
of guilt as he does as a sin of omission involved in looking the other way suggests it is the 
failure of an aggregate (a majority) of actual agents that counts, so the way is not opened to a 
metaphysical conception. Where a metaphysical account would be needed, however, is in 
relation to those who did not look the other way, and who still feel guilt, or those in 
subsequent generations who express feelings of guilt for the tradition and the actions of the 
earlier generations.  
Levi’s approach to this can be discerned from the penultimate chapter of The Drowned and 
the Saved, where he reports on correspondence with Germans. To one he writes that he feels 
no hatred for the Germans as a whole, that hatred is only due to the perpetrators, and that any 
judge should only punish actual culprits and not those innocent of crimes (Levi 2013, 212). 
But this does not exclude for Levi a sense of collective guilt, in the manner expressed by 
Jaspers. While it is ‘dangerous, wrong, to speak about the ‘Germans’, or any other people as 
of a single undifferentiated entity, and include all individuals in one judgement’, at the same 
time, ‘I don’t think I would deny that there exists a spirit of each people (otherwise it would 
not be a people), a Deutschtum, an Italianata, an Hispanidad’ so that one can expect ‘one 
specific, collective behaviour rather than another’, while dismissing caricature and allowing 
for individual exceptions (Levi 2013, 210-1). This is difficult territory, but Levi follows it by 
quoting a German physician who writes to him that he is ‘conscious of being implicated in 
the greatness and culpability of my people’ and that he ‘stands before you as an accomplice 
of those who did violence to your destiny and the destiny of your people’ (Levi 2013, 212-3). 
With regard to the generation to come, Levi quotes without comment but seemingly with 
approval the following: 
At the end of the war I was still a child; I cannot take upon myself any share of guilt 
for the frightful crimes committed by the Germans; and yet I am ashamed of them…. 
You write that you cannot understand the Germans. If it is your intention to allude to 
the executioners and their helpers, then I too cannot understand them; but I hope I will 
have the strength to fight them if they should appear again on the stage of history. I 
spoke of ‘shame’: I meant to express this feeling – that what was perpetrated by 
German hands at that time should never have happened, nor should it have been 
approved of by other Germans. (Levi 2013, 213) 
Behind this sense of historical resolve, there seems to stand a sense of collective 
responsibility in the Jaspersian sense. The line of argument is familiar, and it is also seen in 
the work of Jean Améry, whom Levi discusses in the Drowned and the Saved, and whose 
approach to blaming is rather different to Levi’s. Yet, on this point, there is little difference. 
Améry too begins by taking an aggregative view. Collective guilt is, he says ‘sheer nonsense 
if it implies that the community of Germans possessed a common consciousness, a common 
will, a common initiative to act’ (Améry 1980, 72), but it is a useful hypothesis if it means 
’the objectively manifested sum of individual guilty conduct’. From that point of view, there 
‘grows out of the guilt of individual Germans … a total guilt of the people.’ Collective guilt 
must be demystified, but can then be seen as based upon a ‘statistical statement’ (Améry 
1980, 73). Beyond this, however, there is also a further sense of collective guilt that is non-
                                                          
11 ‘I repeat: the true crime, the collective, general crime of almost all Germans of that time was that of lacking 
the courage to speak.’ (Levi 2013, 208) 
summative or aggregative, in the sense of sharing in a particular culture and history that has 
in some way produced Nazism, and to which all belong:  
It is understandable that the young people are free of individual guilt and of the 
collective guilt that results from its summation….. [Yet] as long as the German 
nation, including its young and its youngest groups, does not decide to live entirely 
without history … then it must continue to bear responsibility for those twelve years 
that it certainly did not terminate itself. German youth cannot cite Goethe, Morike, 
and Baron von Stein, and ignore Blunck, Wilhelm Schafer, and Heinrich Himmler. 
(Améry 1980, 76) 
To summarise and conclude this section, we might say that in Levi, the moral status of 
perpetrators and victims represent the more straightforward pivot on which hinges the guilt of 
survivors, bystanders and the collective group. Yet, if we are to answer Arendt’s problem, the 
underlying structure of a metaphysical guilt is required in order to render that pivot 
straightforward. It is only, then, once we understand this position that we can move towards 
an understanding of the grey zone, wherein the complicity of victims in perpetration in the 
systematic context of the Camp may lead to the impotence of judging. Lurking behind this 
ethical problematic is the guilt of the survivor, a guilt that is both with and without ground. 
Metaphysical guilt also underlies what is explicable and valid in the concept of collective 
guilt. The greatness of Levi’s testimony of the Camp is that he is able to reflect with clear 
moral vision on how guilt in its different forms could be experienced, described and 
differentiated. What I have sought to do here is to think through the kind of ethical structure 
that would be necessary to ground Levi’s judgements.12 Taking my cue from his and others’ 
reflections, especially on survivor guilt, it seems to me that the kind of meta-ethics, or ethical 
structure, necessary is one that can ground the distinctions between different guilt forms, and 
provide them with a deeper framing that structurally locates them. Such a framing is provided 
by the kind of metaphysical account of ethics I have discussed here. 
 
Conclusion 
My starting point in this essay was the issue of survivor guilt. How do we understand it, what 
does it tell us about guilt in general, and how does it connect with Jaspers’s account of 
metaphysical guilt? What we find in Levi is a subtle and nuanced series of judgments about 
guilt in the concentration camps, in which perpetrators remain perpetrators and victims 
victims, but between the two their stands a grey zone in which the two sides, while remaining 
apart, also blur together. To be a complicit victim is not the same as a perpetrator, but it is to 
participate in a way that can lead to an attribution of responsibility, or not. It may be a 
question of suspending a judgment, or recognising a quotient of guilt, or both, or neither. 
There is no question of denying key distinctions, but there are still questions to be addressed 
which run up against those distinctions. The figure of Rumkowski, or the crematorium 
ravens, or the guilty survivor focuses the issue, but it also goes deeper into our sense of what 
it means to be human, and this is where the idea of metaphysical guilt comes in. From this 
standpoint, it is also essential to think through the issue of collective guilt. No doubt that 
notion should be freed of ‘myth and mystification’ (Améry 1980, 73), its ‘Old Testament’ 
connotations (Améry 1980, 75), and of course it should not be manipulated for political ends. 
                                                          
12 For an alternative view which sees Levi as divided between Kantian and in effect Levinasian philosophical 
approaches, see Druker 2009. 
Once all that is said, there is still something that we should look at in both a summative and a 
deeper historical sense. 
What are the vulnerabilities we share, and what do we owe to each other in terms of 
fundamental questions about solidarity and our moral being? The question of the right to live 
in the place of another, and what we may do, or should do, or owe to the other require an 
understanding of what it is that is universal in the human condition: the things we 
fundamentally share as human beings. These questions can’t be answered as a matter simply 
of psychological mechanism: they require an understanding of the deep ethics at the core of 
our being. It is that deep ethics that is brought out by confronting Arendt’s vision of 
Eichmann, Jaspers’s account of metaphysical guilt, and Levi’s experience and nuanced 
judgment of the Camp. 
Relating this back to Bhaskar’s journey through critical realism to its dialectical phase, and 
on to metaReality, if the first two are about understanding the working of natural necessity 
and the place of human, ultimately moral, agency in the world, then the issues surrounding 
agency as an emergent power of biological matter disclose important questions of human 
freedom. In these phases, questions concerning the historical, structural and organisational 
dimensions of a social phenomenon are central. Critical realism has its feet firmly planted in 
the social and historical understanding of the human world, but this then leads us in the 
direction of fundamental questions about the human condition that touch on our universality 
and what we owe each other. The questions at this third level are not separate from the first 
two, but are already present in them. In what I have sought to explore in this essay about 
metaphysical guilt, and how it comes out of the most cruel experience, I have tried to indicate 
that the thought needed to understand the concentration camp, and its aftermath, leads us into 
the same area. In this way Bhaskar’s understanding of metaReality underlabours for our 
understanding of some of the darkest moral experiences that have confronted human beings – 
by implication, all human beings. 
An answer to the question of guilt takes us beyond the positive or actual realities of formal 
law, where agents are held responsible for their acts. The Camp discloses the metaphysical 
substratum that underlies our understanding of individual responsibility. Bhaskar’s work 
underlabours to this conclusion. 
